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ACHIEVEMF2frs AND CHALLENGES OF SPACE STATION FREEDOM'S
SAFETY REVIEW PROCESS
David W. Robinson
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Lewis Research Center
Cleveland, Ohio 44135
SUlVIMARY
The most complex space vehicle in history, Space Station Freedom, is well underway
to completion, and System Safety is a vital part of the program. The purpose of this
paper is to summarize and illustrate the progress that over one-hundred System
Safety engineers have made in identifying, documenting, and controlling the hazards
inherent in the space station. To date, Space Station Freedom has been reviewed by
NASA's safety panels through the first six assembly flights, when Freedom achieves a
configuration known as Man Tended Capability. During the eight weeks of safety
reviews spread out over a year and a half, over 200 preliminary hazard reports were
presented. Along the way NASA and its contractors faced many challenges, made
much progress, and even learned a few lessons.
INTRODUCTION TO SPACE STATION FREEDOM
Space Station Freedom is a complex vehicle, and some would say it is an even
more complex program. Figure 1 shows the baseline configuration as of May 1993,
and Figure 2 provides some key space station performance details. Since Freedom
will be the largest space vehicle ever created, the work has been split up among
several NASA centers in discrete "Work Packages" which are detailed in Figure 3.
The first of Freedom's 17 assembly flights is scheduled for 1996 and the last is
planned for the year 2000. After completion, four astronauts will live there on 90-day
rotational assignments performing life science and materials processing experiments
in microgravity.
Freedom is a self-contained world orbiting around the earth that must supply
all the needs for its crew including air, water, food, electricity, and climate control,
just to name a few. Because evacuation of the space station in case of a fire, system
loss, or mishap is expensive and risky, Freedom must have an extremely robust and
failure tolerant design yet be simple enough that a crew of four can operate and
maintain it.
The space station has something of interest for every kind of System Safety
engineer. Freedom presents hazards one might expect in an earth-bound industrial
facility, and more. Space station hazards that would be familiar to every System
Safety engineer include fire, electric shock, and pressure vessel rupture. Many
hazards, however, sound like something out of a Buck Rogers episode. Impacts by
orbital debris, atomic oxygen corrosion, loss of reboost capability, and electrical
arcing between station and the plasma environment of low earth orbit all could cause
a catastrophic loss. These are the most worrisome hazards since NASA has little or
no prior experience with them.
NASA's SAFETY REVIEW PROCESS AND ITS OB|ECTIVES
The objective of NASA's System Safety effort is to prevent injury or death to
personnel and major system loss. The primary means to accomplish this objective is
to characterize and document all hazards for NASA management so that they are
cognizant of all risks. NASA program management has the authority to either
eliminate, mitigate, or accept these risks. In keeping with this policy, all aspects of
Space Station Freedom are being thoroughly reviewed by NASA for hazards to
ground processing facilities, the crew, the space shuttle, and the station itself. All
HRs must be approved and closed out by the program manager before the space
station is launched.
The system safety process used by NASA in the manned spaceflight world is
similar to the MIL-STD-882 approach--with a few modifications. Hazard analyses are
performed to identify all hazard causes and controls, and a Hazard Report (HR) is
written to document each hazardous condition. Depending on the type of hazard,
engineers from the responsible prime contractor will present each HR to as many as
three different NASA safety review panels. HRs are reviewed by the panels at
several points during the design and development of the space station as shown
below:
PHASE
Phase 1
Phase 2
Phase 3
TIMEFRAME
PDR (Prelim Design Review)
CDR (Critical Design Review)
DCR (Design Certification)
HR MATURITY
Hazard Causes/Controls identified
Control verifications established
Control verifications closed out
By signing off on these HRs at the Phase 3 safety reviews, NASA program
management formally accepts the risk imposed by each hazard.
NASA's three safety panels consist of the Ground Safety Review Panel (GSRP),
the Shuttle Payload Safety Review Panel (PSRP) and the Freedom Safety Review
Panel (FSRP). The GSRP is composed of Kennedy Space Center engineers who assess
compliance with Kennedy Space Center's ground processing safety requirements
document KHB 1700.7B and the risk posed by the payload to the facilities and
personnel. The PSRP is composed of Johnson Space Center engineers who assess
compliance with the shuttle payload safety requirements of NSTS 1700.7B and the
risk posed by the payload to the Space Shuttle and astronauts. Providing substantial
credibility and depth to the PSRP, a small army of experts supports the panel in
various fields such as flammability, fracture mechanics, and toxicity. The FSRP is
composed primarily of System Safety managers from the NASA centers working on
Freedom who review hazards causing crewmember injury or loss/damage to the
space station. In contrast to the PSRP and GSRP, the FSRP cannot accept risk, and
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acts as an independent oversight committee making risk recommendations to space
station program management.
SPACE STATION FREEDOM SAFETY REVIEWS
Between September 16, 1991 and January 28, 1993, the PSRP and FSRP jointly
held a total of eight safety reviews, each lasting an average of a week. The first
meeting in September of 1991 was labelled a "Pathfinder." Its purpose was to
convene the FSRP for the first time and establish rules, meeting protocol, and safety
philosophy. Both the PSRP and FSRP were also given presentations of the
preliminary design of Freedom. At the Pathfinder an extraordinary number of
System Safety engineers were present from various NASA centers and numerous
aerospace corporations from around the country. Since every center and company
brought its own "safety culture" to the meeting, extensive safety philosophy
discussions were needed to gain consensus from this diverse group on the process
and procedures for the upcoming series of Freedom safety reviews.
Over the following sixteen months, Space Station Freedom was reviewed
through the Man Tended Capability configuration, or first six assembly flights. All
aspects of Freedom (except ground processing) were covered, including launch, on-
orbit payload deployment, assembly by spacewalking astronauts, system startup, and
nominal operation. 210 HRs were presented to the panels, and 188 were signed by
them. Signature at Phase 1 indicates that the panels believe hazard causes are
properly identified and the controls are adequate. Figure 4 shows the detailed
breakdown of HRs Signed and submitted per flight and Work Package.
The HRs that were not signed were unacceptable to the panels for a variety of
reasons. A few of the HRs documented procedures or designs which violated safety
requirements. Other HRs were simply incomplete or vague. For example, one
unsigned HR described the structural failure of an appendage, but after extensive
questioning the PSRP determined that n0t all the failure modes were accounted for.
Therefore, the HR was not sufficiently developed to the Phase 1 level. The Work
Package revised the HR and returned at a subsequent review for concurrence.
To resolve issues or discrepancies unearthed in the reviews, the panels
assigned action items to the appropriate Work Package. Responses to these action
items were presented at subsequent reviews and closed out if deemed acceptable by
the panels. A typical action item levied on a Work Package was to determine if a
particular subcontractor's honeycomb panel adhesive bonding process specification
was adequate and to report the findings at the next safety review. Figure 4 details
the number of action items assigned per Work Package at the reviews. As a rough
indicator of the quality of the review, more thorough presentations received fewer
action items.
The safety reviews prompted the program to eliminate many hazards. In
many instances the safety reviews served as the forum for management to see the
whole scope of a hazard for the first time. Increased management appreciation of the
total risk of a hazard sometimes resulted in design or procedural modifications to
mitigate or reduce those risks. A typical example of a hazard eliminated as a result
of the safety review process was the elimination of sharp edges On the radiant heat
fins of some electronic boxes. Since sharp edges could puncture the space suit, they
are a potentially catastrophic hazard to the astronaut during an extra-vehicular
activity. The simple solution was to round the sharp edges into a benign shape.
Indeed, this was a design requirement, but in this application it was either not fully
understood or deemed inconvenient by the designers. However, with the penetrating
spotlight of the PSRP on the problem, it was not too long before a design change was
implemented.
Another more complex design change involved upgrading the thermal control
system from zero to single failure tolerance. The electrical power system has its own
thermal control system consisting of ammonia coolant loops throughout the structure
which pick up heat from the electronics and reject it into space at the radiator. In a
previous weight scrub exercise, the redundant ammonia coolant loops for the thermal
control system were merged into one loop. A single impact from a chunk of orbital
debris, although unlikely, could have penetrated this loop and caused the loss of all
the coolant, in turn reducing the electrical power output from 18.75 kilowatts to
nearly zero on the early flights-a catastrophic hazard. This risk had previously been
accepted by NASA program management, but after the attention it received during
the safety reviews, NASA reconsidered the risk and approved the design change back
to two independent coolant loops.
Many more examples of eliminated or controlled hazards exist, but the public
probably will never hear about those successes because controlled hazards do not
make newspaper headlines. That is the bittersweet nature of System Safety-its
effectiveness is often intangible and only measured by degrees of failure. When
Safety is successful, mishaps are prevented, but when Safety is unsuccessful, tragic
loss occurs and everyone learns--too late-that the system was not safe enough.
The safety reviews provided a valuable benefit to Freedom's System Safety
engineers as well. By having a credible and highly visible forum to air the risk
inherent in space station, System Safety moved higher in the esteem of the design
community. Whereas previous system safety efforts and opinions were viewed by
many as a nuisance, after the safety reviews System Safety began receiving more calls
from various design groups to interact with them on design decisions. Management
began soliciting Safety's opinions more often, and as a result more favorable risk
decisions were made by the program. NASA benefitted immensely by having risk
documented and presented in an impartial manner so that decisions could be made
with full awareness of how the outcome would affect overall station safety.
CHALLENGES AND ACHIEVEMENTS
Streamlining the Safety Review Process
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The task of successfully completing the safety reviews was not easy for NASA
and its contractors. Many challenges and obstacles had to be met and overcome.
Perhaps the greatest challenge was to present the ocean of information about
Freedom to the panels in the time allowed. Approximately 10,000 pages of data were
sent to the PSRP and FSRP. Contributing to the flood of data are the many different
safety perspectives that NASA must consider. For example, Space Station Freedom is
at times a payload processed at Kennedy Space Center, a payload in the Shuttle, a
cargo element which must be attended to by spacewalking astronauts during
assembly operations, and a free-flying autonomous space vehicle required to survive
30 years in low earth orbit. Nothing in the history of spaceflight has had as many
interfaces, contractors, facilities, and operations involved.
To minimize the time required to complete a safety review, the Work Packages
learned to give more effident safety presentations. Early reviews tended to be filled
with parameters and design details of interest to the designers (cost, weight, and
performance trade studies) but of limited interest to the safety panels. As the
reviews progressed, the presenters became better able to focus on the safety-related
aspects of designs such as hazard causes and controls. Progress was measurable: the
first safety review (MB-01) required about eight days to complete and only 20 HRs
were submitted, while the last safety review (MB-06) was completed in five days and
56 HRs were submitted. Assuming each review was equally adequate, this
represents an increase in meeting effidency of 448% !
Coordinating multiple interfaces
Another challenge which complicated the safety reviews was the incredible
number of people, organizations, and interfaces involved in the Freedom program.
Three NASA centers and several international partners are responsible for different
pieces of station, and each attended the safety review with their own prime
contractors and subcontractors. Representatives from other NASA committees would
attend as well. Aside from the "people interfaces", there are a number of mechanical
and software interfaces. For example, Work Package 2"s main computer system
partially controls Work Package l's life support system and both are supplied power
by Work Package 4's electric power system. A failure that knocks out a power bus
could also take down the life support system unless power is rerouted quickly by the
main computer system. Intermingled hazards like these create considerable room for
debate about which organization should write and present each hazard.
To coordinate the agenda and flow of each safety review, a telephone
conference, or "dry run," was held a few weeks before. At the dry run, the NASA
centers attempted to set up a logical sequence of presentations and HRs. Sometimes
interface issues, such as which center would write a hazard report on which subject,
would be worked also. A few times small telephone conferences were held with key
PSRP and FSRP members to brief them on upcoming high-profile safety issues. The
dry-run and coordination meetings reduced the time spent at the safety review
working the mundane administrative issues and allowed the Work Packages to focus
more on the technical issues and HRs.
Another resource saving measure was minimizing the attendance at the
reviews. Approximately one-hundred people attended the first couple of reviews,
perhaps because of the novelty. As the reviews became more commonplace,
attendance by non-participants slackened. Also as presenters became more familiar
with the types of questions asked by the panels, fewer engineers were needed at the
review to provide supporting information. One technique was to have engineers "on-
call" back at the contractor's site. Questions not answerable by those present at the
review were phoned to those on-call, and answers could be given to the panels
minutes later. As a result, attendance at later reviews was probably one-third that of
the first. Also, a few times NASA saved money by flying the safety panels to a Work
Package rather than sending the Work Package to the safety review panels.
Reducin_:_HR Development Time
In the beginning, a long lead-time-6 months not being unusual-was required
to gather the safety data, write the hazard reports, review and revise them internally,
and release them to the panels. Since designs sometimes changed radically in 6
months, much effort was made to reduce the safety package preparation time to a
more responsive 2-3 month cycle.
Because hazard reports are somewhat sensitive documents, initially program
management was hesitant to air them in public without extensive coordination and
scrutiny. Various internal "pre-review reviews" and other forums were set up among
the Work Packages so that program management would not be surprised by the
content of the HRs at the safety review. Over time, however, Work Package
management became more comfortable with the safety reviews and some of the extra
meetings were dropped. Program managers and System Safety engineers developed
proactive lines of communication as System Safety was brought more into the
decision making process. Many managers found that by paying attention to Safety
early on, they had no need to set up additional "hoops" for Safety to jump through
later.
Reviewing Cutting Edge Technolom¢
Another factor which slowed the pace of the reviews was that many of the
space station designs and operations are on the cutting edge of technology. More
lines of software code will be written for Freedom than for any previous space
vehicle. More functions will be autonomously monitored, cycled, and reconfigured
by the on-board computers without the crew in the loop. Thousands of hours of
extra-vehicular activity will be required to assemble and maintain Freedom. Also
several different robots will be installed on Freedom to assist with maintenance and
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assembly tasks. All these represent new genres of hazards to work. Since little or no
experience base exists to guide the safety panels on these subjects, review of these
designs and operations proceeded slowly and cautiously.
Safety Panels Adjusted, too
The panels, too, had challenges to overcome. Both the PSRP and FSRP had to
adjust to the sheer volume of data. More homework was required of members before
a review than with other, simpler payloads. Many different requirements or
definitions existed in the Freedom program than in other payloads, at times causing
some confusion among panel members.
A major adjustment had to be made in the authority traditionally granted to
the PSRP. Usually the absolute authority in matters of Shuttle and Crew safety, the
PSRP was confronted with a program that would not and could not always yield to
their mandates. For all other payloads, the PSRP has "fly/no-fly" authority and
ensures that any undue risk to the Shuttle is eliminated or shifted into the payload,
regardless of cost and schedule. With Freedom however, a larger, holistic risk
management approach is required. Since the Space Station Freedom program is
every bit as important to NASA as the Space Shuttle Program, sometimes it is in the
best interest of NASA to accept a small risk to Shuttle rather than to accept a large
risk to Freedom. In the spirit of Station/Shuttle joint risk management, some
longstanding payload requirements have been relaxed--although not forgotten-by the
vigilant members of the PSRP.
One example of a relaxed requirement pertains to electrical connectors.
During assembly operations on Freedom, many electrical connections have to be
made by spacewalking astronauts. According to the PSRP's NSTS 1700.7B
requirements, three inhibits (open switches) must be in place to permit the electrical
connection. Due to the unreasonable weight and cost increases to implement this on
Freedom, the PSRP decided to allow a single inhibit for electrical connections,
provided that the Work Packages prove that no arcing hazard is present should that
inhibit fail.
Genetic Hazards
Early on during the reviews it was noted hazards such as micrometeoroid
impact, atomic oxygen degradation, and battery leakage were not unique to any
particular flight or mission stage but rather recurred throughout the life of Freedom.
After considerable debate, the panels agreed to accept "generic" hazard reports for
these situations. Generic HRs would be presented and signed only once. For each
subsequent flight or stage where that generic hazard was present, the HR would be
included in the safety data package but not presented again to the panels, greatly
reducing the paperwork. For example, during the reviews, Work Package 4
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presented 34 generic HRs to the panels versus 204 HRs that would have been
required if each flight's hazards had to be handled individually.
Keeping track of the paperwork
With so many different flights, contractors, review panels, HRs, and systems to
consider, it quickly became confusing who had presented what to whom and when.
To alleviate the confusion, a "master matrix" was developed by the Work Packages to
record what HR had been presented to which panel and when. Figure 5 shows an
example of a master matrix. The idea is to simultaneously show what flight a hazard
is present, when the HR was presented to which panel, and if the HR was generic or
specific to a particular flight.
In addition to matrices, Work Packages began presenting "Hazard Trees" at the
beginning of each review. Figure 6 is an example tree from Work Package 4. The
tree illustrates the coverage of each HR and where it fits in relation to the rest of the
HRs, much like an illustrated table of contents. Hazard trees reduced the confusion
of where a particular hazard was documented in the HRs, and minimized questions
from the panel members.
CONCLUSION
The primary achievement of the safety reviews was that for the first time in
the Freedom program, NASA management received a comprehensive look at the
overall risk of Space Station Freedom. Managers and engineers alike gained a greater
appreciation of the discipline of System Safety. Safety organizations gained more
credibility and stronger lines of communication within the design community. While
it is difficult to measure the amount of risk eliminated as a result of these safety
reviews, there is no question that the overall risk has been reduced. Design changes
prompted by the reviews have eliminated several catastrophic hazards.
The safety review process has been streamlined considerably. System Safety
engineers and panel members are gaining proficiency in the process, and as a result,
fewer resources are required to review more material. Several new techniques and
tools have been developed to make the reviews more efficient such as the "generic"
HI{ and the hazard tree. Fewer engineers are required to support the reviews, and
fewer "pre-reviews" are necessary within each NASA center.
The task of System Safety in the Space Station Freedom Program is ongoing,
and sometimes it seems never-ending, There are at least 11 more flights to be
reviewed at the Phase 1 level, and then all 17 flights must be reviewed again at the
Phase 2 and Phase 3 level before Freedom is complete in 2000. With so many more
reviews ahead, there is no doubt that further improvements will be made along the
way.
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....... Configuration Capabilities _ '.... "
Man Tended Capability Permanently Manned Capability
1997 2000
Pov_ ............. ".................... le.Zskw-l_ .............. ".........._._6__ : 3PVrnocUes..............
Module lengti_ 27 ft. - 1 microgtavtty lob 27 ft. -1 lab. 1 hob
U.S.labuserroc_(1_PRs) " " . ":: .... 12 . ""' ." -, " . ......_ '. - " 12 :_._,,_" : , .
User research power 11 kW 30 kW
l.og_rnoUdecapac_ : ....._ _ MPLM-8rad_ : "::-, ....... _:" R.M-20rac_ :......
Command uplink 70kbps 70
Oatado,_ ....................:.: •.. ...._r= ......"......" :.._." .......- ...._Mbr_ _.............
Gravitylevel Ipg ....,.......... I pg _ .
U.S. assembty and logisticsflights 6 17
Dedicated crew fc.-research 4 (wl'_eon statlon) 2 (conflnuo_)
-_=_,,_,_'EMrc_-'_.."_: :j....L_:-,_i:," ._/_._;.-:_..8.__-;.:_:;L-::.-_:;--"'_,- ._- _-," :"_":,.."._.. ,. o:-_":"_"':- .:._W.'X','_ _..: ..: -.__"""".. ..._:._
TnJss 4 segments built_ checked out on ground 7 segments bulttand checked out on ground
Pressurizectresou_e noaes 1 2
_.t_. _,,:_,_e:_. y. _o____- _!i;'_/:;_.M_-__" i_:L'_.-
Japan none JEM - I0 ISPI_
Life Support Shuttle supDortecl
....................... , ....... regenerativewat_ loop
Pre_Jrlzecl docking adopter 1 2
_red Crew Return Vehicle O- use _ 1
Figure 2.
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Space Station Freedom
Safety Review Statistics
Assembly Flights 1 - 6
FLIGHT
NUMBER
MB-01
MB-02
MB-03
MB-04
MB-05
MB-06
WP-01
HRs signed/I I
presented I AIs
o/o o
0/0 0
o/o o
9/9 4
12/14 4
23 / 24 3
!
44147 ! 11
WP-02
HRs signed/]
presente¢ll Als
11/11 29
16 / 16 7
16/16 3
17 / 19 12
17/25 8
17/20 4
I
94 / 107 _ 63
WP-04
HRs signed/
presented I AIs
9/9 5
15 / 16 1
0/0 0
151 15 4
010 0
9111 2
I
48/51 i 12
CSA
HRs signed/_
_esent_ I Als
0/0 0
0/0 0
0/0
114
0/0
0/0
I
114 I
OTHERS
HRs signed/_
presente_I A.Is
0/0 3
o/o 5
0 010 0
8 0/0 I
0 0/0 1
1 0/0 4
I
9 010 !14
TOTALS
HRs signed/I I
presented I A/s
20120 37
31/32 13
16 / 16 3
42 / 47 29
29/39 13
50/56 14
I
188 / 2101109
MB = Manned Base (MB-01 = Manned Base Assembly Flight #1)
WP = Work Package (WP-01 = Work Package #1)
CSA = Canadian Space Agency
HRs = Hazard Reports
AIs = Action Items assigned
NOTE: Figures do not include HRs deleted, withdrawn, or combined
Figure 4.
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MASTER MATRIX
No.
7512
7513
7518
7521
7525
7540
Hazard Description MB-01 MH-02 MB-03 MB-04
CREW INDUCED HARDWARE DAMAGE DURING *, ,* @, ,@ *, ,* *, ,*
ASSEMBLY OPERATIONS
SHARP EDGES, CORNERS, PROTRUSIONS; EVA F, ,P , , , , , ,
INJURY DURING MB-01 ASSEMBLY OPERATIONS
PREMATURE DEPLOYMENT OF APPENDAGES F, ,P , , , , , ,
DURING MB-01 ASSEMBLY OPERATIONS
FAILURE OF MB-01 CARGO ELEMENT , ,P , , , , , ,
ATTACHMENTS
EPS HIGH TRANSIENT CURRENT SURGES DURING , , F, , , , , ,
START-UP
NI-H2 BATTERIES STRUCTURAL FAILURE , , @, , *, , *, ,
Legend:
F = Flight-specific Hazard report presented to the FSRP
G = Flight-specific Hazard report presented to the GSRP
P = Flight-specific Hazard report presented to the PSRP
* = Generic Hazard Report applicable to one or more flights
@ = Generic Hazard Report presented at a safety review
,_,_ = Three columns: 1st column denotes applicability to FSRP
2nd column denotes applicability to GSRP
3rd column denotes applicability to PSRP
Figure 5.
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Example Hazard Tree
I
Structural
7512: Crew induced h/w damage
7540: Battery leak/rupture
7547: Structural Failure of SPM
7616: Unsafe berthing; stuck mast
SSF Loss/Damage
I
i
Loss of Power to
Critical Functions
I
Nat'l/Induced Environment
7501: Atomic Oxygen
7502: Ionizing Radiation
7503: Meteoroid/Orbital Debris
7522: EMI to and from EPS
7548: Corrosion/Contamination
I
Hardware Failures
7516: TCS pump failure
7621: Passively cooled DDCUs
I
EPS function loss
7524: EPS fault currents
7631: Battery charging failure
7632: Loss of EPS channel
7634: EPS stability
7637: Post-startup transients
7641: Loss of EPS data
7643: Voltage reg. malfunction
Figure 6.
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